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MARK P. STRASSER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court struck down same-
sex marriage bans as a violation of federal constitutional guarantees.1 This decision 
was very important for same-sex couples and their families, and may well be the 
springboard for the recognition of additional rights for sexual minorities and other 
marginalized groups.2  Yet, Obergefell is surprising in both form and focus, which 
complicates not only predicting the decision’s effects but even inferring what the 
opinion is trying to do beyond striking down the bans. 
Part I of this article examines Obergefell’s discussion of due process 
guarantees, noting some of the ways in which the opinion is less persuasive than 
it might have been and offering some possible explanations of why the opinion 
was crafted this way. Part II discusses the equal protection analysis, explaining 
some of the ways in which the opinion complicates the jurisprudence. The article 
concludes by discussing some of the respects in which Obergefell is so open-ended 
that it could provide the basis for restricting or expanding equal protection and 
due process guarantees. 
I. THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Many commentators expected the Obergefell Court to strike down same-sex 
marriage bans,3 at least in part because several circuit courts had struck down such 
bans and the Supreme Court had denied certiorari when those cases were 
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1.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“The right of same-sex couples to marry
that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that 
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”). 
2.  See Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell Decision: Equal
Dignity as a Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 5 (2016) (“The language of the opinion sheds new 
light on constitutional interpretation and can be used to advance the civil rights of gays beyond the 
context of marriage.”). 
3.  Anthony O’Rourke, Substantive Due Process for Noncitizens: Lessons from Obergefell, 114 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 9 (2015) (“The outcome of the case was a foregone conclusion after the
Court, in United States v. Windsor, signaled its views regarding the constitutional importance of same-
sex marriage rights.”); Maureen Johnson, You Had Me at Hello: Examining the Impact of Powerful
Introductory Emotional Hooks Set Forth in Appellate Briefs Filed in Recent Hotly Contested U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions, 49 IND. L. REV. 397, 428 (2016) (“By the time Obergefell made its way to the Supreme Court,
many courts and legal commentators believed that Windsor mandated a finding that there was a
constitutional right for gays and lesbians to marry.”). 
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appealed.4 Yet, the circuit courts were far from unanimous when explaining why 
those bans violated constitutional guarantees,5 and the Court finally granting 
certiorari provided reason to hope that the Court would add some clarity to the 
implicated issues.6 While the Obergefell opinion did resolve some issues, it raised 
many more questions than it answered and is more likely to undermine rather 
than promote consensus among the circuits about the proper way to approach due 
process issues. 
A. Which Relationships Have Constitutional Significance? 
The Obergefell opinion focused on the importance of marriage, describing it 
as having “transcendent importance”7 and as an institution that “always has 
promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in 
life.”8 Marriage is not only “sacred to those who live by their religions . . . [but] 
offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm.”9 
Marriage “is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations,”10 is “central[] 
. . . to the human condition,”11 and provides a variety of benefits, because “through 
its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as 
expression, intimacy, and spirituality . . . [which] is true for all persons, whatever 
their sexual orientation.”12 Further, “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two 
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such 
profound choices.”13 
Some of the Obergefell Court’s discussion of marriage is reminiscent of the 
Court’s discussion of the same topic in Griswold v. Connecticut: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of 
 
 4.  Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015), and cert. denied 
sub nom. Idaho v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015), and cert. dismissed sub nom. Coal. for the Prot. of Marriage 
v. Sevcik, 136 S. Ct. 13 (2015); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. 
Ct. 286 (2014), and cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. 
Ct. 314 (2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014), and cert. 
denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 5.  Compare Baskin, 766 F.3d at 665 (striking down same-sex marriage ban on rational basis 
grounds as a violation of equal protection guarantees), with Bostic, 760 F.3d at 367 (striking down same-
sex marriage ban as a violation of the fundamental right to marry). 
 6.  Cf. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law 2013-2014: Same-Sex 
Couples Attain Rights to Marry and Parent, 48 FAM. L.Q. 609–10 (2015)  
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals led the way by upholding a lower district court decision 
finding Utah’s constitutional ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional on substantive due 
process grounds. Four other circuits followed striking same-sex marriage bans for a variety 
of reasons . . . By next year’s article, the same-sex marriage issue will be resolved.  
 7.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–95 (2013)). 
 13.  Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).  
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life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any 
involved in our prior decisions.14 
Yet, Griswold’s discussion of marriage occurred prior to the Court’s 
recognition in Loving v. Virginia that marriage was protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 Post-Loving, one might have expected the 
Court to simply explain that the right to marry is protected by substantive due 
process guarantees and, possibly, that the right to marry includes the right to 
marry someone of the same sex. 
It is not as if the Obergefell Court failed to make these points. On the contrary, 
in addition to waxing eloquent about the importance of marriage, the Court also 
noted that the right to marry is a fundamental right16 and that same-sex couples 
may exercise that right.17 Thus, the Court both said what was necessary to avoid 
having to talk about the importance of marriage and nonetheless made clear that 
marriage occupies a special position in the Constitution’s hierarchy of values. The 
Court’s extended discussion of marriage made some commentators wonder 
whether the Court was implicitly if not explicitly suggesting that those in non-
marital relationships were not deserving of respect.18 
Before reaching the conclusion that the Obergefell Court was signaling that 
marriage is the only relationship protected by the Constitution, one should 
consider a different post-Loving marriage decision.19 In Zablocki v. Redhail, which 
was issued after Loving,20  the Court described “marriage as ‘the most important 
relation in life’”21 and “as ‘the foundation of the family and of society, without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.’”22 Yet, some 
commentators read Zablocki as providing the basis for protecting non-marital 
 
 14.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 15.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty 
without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”). 
 16.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589 (“[T]he right to marry is fundamental.”). 
 17.  Id. at 2599 (“[S]ame-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”). 
 18.  See Leonore Carpenter & David S. Cohen, A Union Unlike Any Other: Obergefell and the 
Doctrine of Marital Superiority, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 124, 127 (2015) (“Obergefell . . . valorizes marriage 
qua marriage, imbuing the status with ephemeral qualities such as dignity and profundity, and 
shaming those who do not participate.”); Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 
6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 117, 123 (2015) (“Obergefell . . . cares little about the indignity of those benefits being 
tied to marital status, and the right to dignity of unmarried families.”); Nancy E. Dowd, Bridging the 
Work/Family Divide: Implications of A Broader Sex Discrimination Analysis for Men’s Work/Family Issues, 67 
FLA. L. REV. F. 122, 123 (2016) (“Obergefell’s exaltation of marriage and potential conservatism might 
undermine recognition and support of non-marital families, a disturbing possibility in light of the 
patterns of family difference and diversity, and the patterns of marriage.”). 
 19.  Cf. Mark Strasser, Loving Revisionism: On Restricting Marriage and Subverting the Constitution, 
51 HOW. L.J. 75, 87 (2007) (noting that “[t]he Zablocki Court was unstinting in its praise of marriage”). 
 20.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (“The leading decision of this Court on the right 
to marry is Loving.”). 
 21.  Id. at 384 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)). 
 22.  Id. (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211). 
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associations rather than as privileging marriage over other kinds of relationships.23 
Thus, Zablocki at least suggests the possibility that the Obergefell Court’s extolling 
the virtues of marriage need not undermine the values of other types of 
relationships.24 
Zablocki is useful to consider for yet another reason, because it may offer a 
clue as to why the Obergefell Court praised marriage so effusively. At issue in 
Zablocki was a Wisconsin statute that precluded noncustodial parents from 
marrying if they had an existing child support obligation that they were unable to 
pay.25 The Loving Court had suggested that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men”26 and that “deny[ing] this fundamental freedom on so 
unsupportable a basis as [a] racial classification . . . is surely to deprive all the 
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”27 But Zablocki did not 
involve a racial classification, and there was some question whether Loving would 
provide the basis for protecting the right to marry when issues of race were not 
implicated.28 
Most of the Loving opinion involved why Virginia’s interracial marriage ban 
violated federal equal protection guarantees,29 and the Virginia law could have 
been struck down on equal protection grounds alone.30 In contrast, the equal 
protection classification at issue in Zablocki involved economic status rather than 
race,31 and the Court had already held that indigency was not a suspect 
classification.32 Because poverty did not trigger closer scrutiny, the Court’s 
 
 23.  See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 671 (1980) (“Properly 
understood, Zablocki implies a thoroughgoing reassessment of the constitutionality of a wide range of 
state laws limiting the right to marry and restricting other nonmarital forms of intimate association.”). 
 24.  Regrettably, some commentators characterizing Obergefell as “shaming those who do not 
participate” in marriage fail to consider the implications of Zablocki when offering this interpretation 
of Obergefell. See, e.g., Carpenter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 127. 
 25.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375. 
 26.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Cf. John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J. 15, 25 
(2007) (“Zablocki, moreover, made clear that the Court’s unwillingness to tolerate certain marriage 
restrictions was not limited to those drawn on the basis of race.”). 
 29.  Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want to Be 
with the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 220, 264 (2010) 
(describing “Loving [as] primarily being an equal protection opinion”); Mark Strasser, Windsor and Its 
Progeny, 13 AVE MARIA L. REV. 181, 190 (2015) (“While Loving establishes the fundamental right to 
marry, most of that opinion was focused on the equal protection aspect of the interracial marriage 
ban.”). 
 30.  Joseph A. Pull, Questioning the Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 84 (2006) (“The 
language about legal-marriage being a fundamental right in Loving was completely unnecessary to the 
holding of the case; equal protection doctrine alone required the Loving outcome.”). 
 31.  See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 (“Some of those in the affected class, like appellee, will never be 
able to obtain the necessary court order, because they either lack the financial means to meet their 
support obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public charges.”). 
 32.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (rejecting that poverty is 
a suspect classification); see also Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper 
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 726 (2008) 
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employing a tougher standard of review would be dependent upon the nature of 
the interest affected rather than the class targeted.33 
The constitutionality of the statute at issue was a closer call in Zablocki than 
Loving for an additional reason. While the Loving Court rejected that the state had 
a legitimate interest in prohibiting racial intermarriage,34 the Zablocki Court 
recognized that the state had legitimate if not important interests in preventing a 
noncustodial parent with support obligations from marrying someone other than 
the custodial parent if that noncustodial parent was unable to pay the court-
ordered child support already owed.35 Had the Court employed rational basis 
review, the Wisconsin statue would likely have been upheld.36 By emphasizing the 
importance of the individual interest at stake,37 the Zablocki Court emphasized how 
much was lost by precluding the marriage at issue. So, too, the Obergefell Court’s 
paean to marriage38 may not simply have been a “rhetorical flourish”39 but, 
instead, an attempt to suggest how much is lost by individuals who have 
arbitrarily been denied the right to marry.40 The Court noted that marriage has the 
same import for same-sex couples as it does for different sex couples,41 so the 
denial would impose a variety of opportunity costs in addition to the stigma of 
being prohibited from marrying.42 
While the Obergefell Court may have been extolling marriage to illustrate the 
severity of the burden imposed on same-sex couples who are precluded from 
marrying, the Court may have had other purposes in mind. Demographic trends 
reflect that more and more couples are choosing to live together without benefit of 
 
(“[I]f the case [Zablocki] truly were only an equal protection case, rational basis review would have 
applied because wealth is not a suspect classification.”). 
 33.  Cf. Chris Bower, Juggling Rights and Utility: A Legal and Philosophical Framework for Analyzing 
Same-Sex Marriage in the Wake of United States v. Windsor, 102 CAL. L. REV. 971, 974 (2014) (“Under the 
traditional tiers-of-scrutiny framework, a government action that treats a suspect class unequally or 
infringes on a fundamental right can be justified whenever the violation is narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling government interest.”). 
 34.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of 
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”). 
 35.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“We may accept for present purposes that these are legitimate and 
substantial interests.”). 
 36.  See Rush, supra note 32, at 726 (“[U]nder rational basis review, the law [at issue in Zablocki] 
might have been upheld.”). 
 37.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. 
 38.  Carpenter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 125 (“Obergefell is largely a lengthy paean to traditional 
marriage.”). 
 39.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). 
 40.  But see Carpenter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 129 (“By framing the opinion as a love letter to 
marriage itself, the Court has moved beyond an equal access rationale and toward an implicit 
determination that marriage is so critical that states are constitutionally required to offer that institution 
as the enduring and unique way to recognize relationships.”). 
 41.  See Obergefell 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 42.  Id. at 2602 (“[L]aws excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and 
injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”). 
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marriage.43 Perhaps the Court was trying to urge more couples to marry44 or was 
even endorsing the view that unmarried individuals should not enjoy the same 
status as those who are married.45 Some commentators worry that Obergefell bodes 
poorly for the treatment of non-marital couples.46 
Obergefell need not be read to privilege marital over non-marital 
relationships47 and, instead, might be read to offer implicit support for the dignity 
of non-marital relationships.48 To see why, one should read both the Lawrence 
opinion and what the Obergefell Court said about that opinion.49 
  
 
 43.  See Rigel C. Oliveri, Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choose Household 
Companions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1401, 1448 (2015)  (noting that “for an increasing number of people 
cohabitation has replaced marriage”); Raymond C. O’Brien, Family Law’s Challenge to Religious Liberty, 
35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 3, 8 (2012) (noting that an “increasing number of couples choose to enter 
into nonmarital cohabitation rather than marry at all”); Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival of Nonmarital 
Relationship Statuses in the Same-Sex Marriage Era: A Proposal, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 45, 61 (2014) (“With 
marriage in decline, cohabitation on the rise, and the number of children born to cohabiting couples 
increasing at a rapid pace, there is ample reason to rethink marriage as the sole intimate adult 
relationship upon which legal rights and protections are granted.”). 
 44.  But see Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 31 (2015) 
(“To penalize individuals for living either alone or in intimate nonmarital arrangements in the name 
of honoring and encouraging marriage is akin to denying same-sex couples the right to marry in the 
name of honoring and encouraging marriage by opposite-sex couples—a justification that Justice 
Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion rightly repudiated.”).  
 45.  See Carpenter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 127 (“Obergefell does not merely stress the importance 
of marriage as the only currently existing gatekeeper for other benefits and rights; rather, it valorizes 
marriage qua marriage, imbuing the status with ephemeral qualities such as dignity and profundity, 
and shaming those who do not participate.”).  
 46.  Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1249–
50 (2016) (“The Court envisions nonmarital life, including nonmarital childrearing, as inferior.”). See 
Carpenter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 127 (“According to the Court, people wishing to become their best 
selves and to live a life free from loneliness must follow the most traditional of all paths: find a life-
long companion to the exclusion of all others and then get hitched. Any other way that an individual 
might seek fulfillment and happiness is inferior.”); Ruth Colker, The Freedom to Choose to Marry, 30 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383, 389 (2016) (“The Obergefell Court’s emphasis on the importance of children 
being raised by married parents reflects the historical stigma against nonmarital parents and their 
children.”). 
 47.  See Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its Relationship to Family Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 197, 198 (2016) (“I posit an even more radical proposition: I argue that marriage equality might open 
up progressive possibilities not just for nonmarital children, but also for nonmarital adult 
relationships.”). 
 48.  See infra notes 50–91 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See infra notes 50–75 and accompanying text. 
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In Lawrence v. Texas,50 the Court struck down on due process grounds51 a 
Texas law criminalizing same-sex relations.52 While the Court held that the “right 
to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives . . . [same-sex couples] the full right 
to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government,”53 the Court 
never described the implicated interest as a fundamental right54 but instead simply 
suggested that the interest was constitutionally protected.55 That said, however, 
the Court also did not describe the right to engage in non-marital relations as a 
mere liberty interest, instead leaving the proper characterization of the interest an 
open question.56 
That open question was answered when the Obergefell Court explained that 
“Bowers upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right and 
caused them pain and humiliation”57 and that “Bowers was eventually repudiated 
in Lawrence.”58 The Court’s describing Bowers as denying a fundamental right and 
 
 50.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 51.  Id. at 564 (“[T]he case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as 
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”); id. at 567 (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as 
free persons . . . The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make 
this choice.”). 
 52.  Id. at 562 (“The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime 
for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”). 
 53.  Id. at 578. 
 54.  See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]owhere does the Court’s opinion declare that 
homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due Process Clause.”); Austin Raynor, Economic 
Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (2013) (“The opinion’s refusal 
to designate the infringed liberty interest as ‘fundamental’ also significantly distances its holding from 
the privacy cases, all of which depend upon such a classification.”). 
 55.  See Donald H. J. Hermann, Extending the Fundamental Right of Marriage to Same-Sex Couples: The 
United States Supreme Court Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 49 IND. L. REV. 367, 369 (2016) (“[I]n 
Lawrence v. Texas, the second sodomy case, the Court reasoned that the case involved a liberty interest 
(the Court did not use the term fundamental right) to engage in sexual intimacy and whether 
homosexuals can be denied that right.”). See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]the 
Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of their liberty’—which it undoubtedly is—
and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching 
implications beyond this case.”); Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in 
Regulating Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 47 (2012) (“In 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court did not explicitly establish that a fundamental right to privacy existed in 
all intimate relationships, but it did invoke a standard beyond mere minimal scrutiny.”). 
 56.  See Mark Strasser, Marriage, the Constitution, and the Future of Family Law, 21 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 303, 304 (2015) (“While the Court in both cases [Windsor and Lawrence] struck 
down laws disadvantaging same-sex couples, the analyses offered neither specified the level of 
scrutiny employed nor whether the rights at issue were fundamental rather than mere liberty 
interests.”); Daniel J. Crooks III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the Inevitable Loving of Our Time, 8 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 223, 256 (2014) (“There is no discussion of privacy in the majority’s opinion, no mention of a 
particular fundamental right, and not so much as a whisper of whether the Texas law in question was 
entitled to deference of any sort.”). 
 57.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606 (emphasis added). 
 58.  Id. 
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then noting that the decision had been overruled suggests that the right at issue—
the right to engage in adult, consensual, non-marital relations59—was not a mere 
liberty interest but was instead itself fundamental.60 
Even if the right to engage in voluntary, adult, intimate relations is 
fundamental, a separate issue involves how broadly that right should be 
construed. The Obergefell Court explained that Lawrence stood for more than the 
proposition that those engaging in adult, consensual relations were immunized 
from criminal prosecution. “But while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom 
that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, 
it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step 
forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”61 
What would the full promise of liberty include? That question is difficult to 
answer, at least in part, because Lawrence involved issues of equality of treatment 
as well as intimate association. The Court might have been suggesting that 
individuals should not be treated differently because they engage in same-sex 
rather than different-sex relations.62 But then a separate question would be 
whether non-marital relations as a general matter were protected.63 
The Obergefell Court explained that under Lawrence both same-sex and 
different-sex couples have the right to engage in intimate relations,64 assuming that 
those relations are voluntary, non-commercial, and between adults.65 Even after 
announcing that the right to intimate association was a fundamental right, the 
Obergefell Court suggested that it is error to believe that the “freedom stops there,” 
66 which leaves open what else that freedom might include. 
The Lawrence Court may have shed some light on what in addition that 
freedom includes when noting that “adults may choose to enter upon . . . [a sexual] 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still 
retain their dignity as free persons.”67 As an initial matter, the Court’s comment 
should not be interpreted as merely indicating that individuals do not lose their 
dignity simply because they have non-marital relationships.68 The Lawrence Court 
 
 59.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 60.  Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in A Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 331, 340 
(2016) (“Obergefell rather clearly describes Lawrence as falling within the Court’s line of cases 
recognizing a fundamental right to ‘intimate association.’”).  
 61.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 62.  Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the 
petitioners and some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument . . . .”). 
 63.  Cf. id. at 575 (“Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some 
might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct 
both between same-sex and different-sex participants.”). 
 64.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same 
right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.”). 
 65.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not 
easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”).  
 66.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 67.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 68.  See Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2858, 2868 (2005) (“The opinion thus limited the 
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said much more: “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with 
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring.”69 In making such a point, the Court strongly implied that the enduring, 
personal, non-marital bond itself has value.70 
The recognition that intimate non-marital relationships have value does not 
establish that states must accord formal recognition to those relationships, and the 
Court expressly refused to address that question. “The statutes do seek to control 
a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is 
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”71 The 
Court reiterated its point later in the opinion—”[The present case] does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”72 
When expressly refusing to address whether federal constitutional 
guarantees protect same-sex marriage, the Court may simply have been noting 
that the issue of same-sex marriage was not before the Court.73 Or, the Court may 
have been undecided about whether same-sex marriage is protected by federal 
constitutional guarantees.74 The focus here, though, is a little different. If one reads 
Lawrence through an Obergefell lens, one sees Lawrence as holding that same-sex 
and different-sex non-marital relationships are equivalent for constitutional 




scope of the privacy right only to the ‘confines of [the] home[],’ and it implied that dignity does not 
inhere in the relationship but instead waits at the threshold to be assumed again upon the individual’s 
departure.”). 
 69.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  
 70.  Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 117, 128 (2011) 
(“[T]he [Lawrence] Court went out of its way to explain that when ‘sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring[,] . . . suggest[ing] that the relationship itself has value independent of the sexual 
relations.’”). 
 71.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added) 
 72.  Id. at 578. 
 73.  Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 
3 STAN. J. CIVIL RIGHTS. & CIVIL L. 1, 3 n.1 (2007) (“Lawrence did not raise the question of marriage 
equality.”) In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court struck down Florida’s punishing 
interracial fornication and adultery more severely than intra-racial fornication and adultery, expressly 
refraining from addressing the constitutionality of the state’s interracial marriage ban. See id. at 196 
(“We accordingly invalidate s 798.05 without expressing any views about the State’s prohibition of 
interracial marriage . . . .”). 
 74.  Kenneth P. Miller, The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 151, 188 
(2016) (“[S]trategists for the gay rights movement believed that the Court [at the time Lawrence was 
issued] was not yet prepared to issue a broad decision granting same-sex couples federal constitutional 
marriage rights. . . .”). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between 
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”).  
 75.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same 
right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.”). 
 76.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
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Does this constitutionally recognized value translate into a requirement that 
states accord to cohabiting couples some or all of the rights enjoyed by married 
couples?77 Certainly, states are permitted to accord non-marital couples and their 
families certain benefits and obligations.78 But states being permitted to do so is 
not equivalent to their being required to do so, and whether states are required by 
the Federal Constitution to do so might depend at least in part upon whether those 
in intimate non-marital relationships enjoy any rights beyond immunity from 
criminal prosecution. 
There is room for disagreement about whether the Obergefell Court viewed 
non-marital relationships as having positive value. Admittedly, the Court made 
some negative comments about non-marital relationships, for example, describing 
one of the couples seeking marriage as “seek[ing] relief from the continuing 
uncertainty their unmarried status creates in their lives.”79 Much of that couple’s 
insecurity was due to Michigan’s refusal to permit second-parent adoption, which 
meant that each of the children raised by the couple was only recognized as having 
one legal parent.80 If the legal parent died, the relationship of the partner (i.e., the 
non-legal parent) with the child would be at risk.81 Yet, that instability and 
insecurity would not have been present if Michigan had recognized second-parent 
adoptions,82 which suggests that marriage is not the only route to establishing 
secure parent-child relations between children and the adults who are raising 
them. 
The Obergefell Court implied that children raised in non-marital households 
“suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser”83 and, further, 
“suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, 
 
 77.  Cf. Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L. REV. 
CIR. 126, 135 (2015) (“Obergefell might come to stand for the core principle that due process and equal 
protection forbid exclusionary laws that demean and reinforce the subordinate status of historically 
marginalized groups. Theoretically, at least, this principle would apply not only to other discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, but also to laws that exclude nonmarried individuals and families from 
obtaining the benefits available to the married.”). 
 78.  See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 590 (2013) (“[Washington courts] 
have advanced the doctrine of ‘committed intimate relationships’ . . . in which the court looks at the 
couple’s conduct during their relationship to see if the relationship demonstrates a marriage-like 
pattern. If the court finds that it does, the couple is treated similarly to married couples with regard to 
property distribution. . . .”). 
 79.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 80.  See id. (“Michigan, however, permits only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals 
to adopt, so each child can have only one woman as his or her legal parent.”); see also Ginger Grimes, 
Masking the Reemergence of Immutability with “Outcomes for Children,” 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 683, 693 (2015) 
(“Michigan law prohibited all unmarried couples from jointly adopting children and thus prevented 
April and Jayne from both being legal parents to their three children on the basis of their marital status. 
Michigan law also prevented same-sex couples from getting married. Together, these laws operated to 
ban all same-sex couples from jointly adopting children.”).  
 81.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (“[W]ere tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other 
would have no legal rights over the children she had not been permitted to adopt.”). 
 82.  Danaya C. Wright, Inheritance Equity: Reforming the Inheritance Penalties Facing Children in 
Nontraditional Families, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22 (2015) (“The second-parent adoption allows 
a nonspouse to adopt a child without terminating the parental rights of the biological co-parent.”). 
 83.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
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relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family 
life.”84 But the Court was not entirely clear about why those families are allegedly 
lesser. The stigma might be due to the state’s prohibiting the couple from marrying 
rather than to the parents choosing not to marry.85 If that is the correct 
interpretation, then children would not be stigmatized merely because their 
parents had rejected the option of marrying. Further, when discussing the material 
costs associated with being raised by unmarried parents, the Court may have had 
in mind some of those discussed in United States v. Windsor,86 for example, the extra 
healthcare costs associated with providing coverage for non-marital partners.87 
While some families might well have to pay those costs, others would not if both 
of the adults were covered by insurance provided by their respective employers.88 
It is simply unclear whether Obergefell should be understood as reifying the 
difference between marital and non-marital relationships.89 Obergefell did cite with 
approval the Lawrence language praising “a personal [non-marital] bond that is 
more enduring,”90 so the resolution of how to value non-marital relationships will 
have to await future opinions.91 A separate issue will be whether lower courts read 
Obergefell as promoting or at least condoning adverse treatment of those in non-
marital relationships, Lawrence’s celebration of the value of intimate non-marital 
relationships notwithstanding.92 Thus, even if the Court did not intend to 
communicate that the Constitution stigmatizes those in non-marital relationships, 
lower courts might nonetheless infer that the Constitution either devalues or 
 
 84.  Id.; see also Colker, supra note 46, at 417 (“The Obergefell Court recognizes the harms that flow 
to the children of unmarried parents—both material and attitudinal.”); NeJaime, supra note 46, at 1249–
50 (“The Court envisions nonmarital life, including nonmarital childrearing, as inferior.”).  
 85.  Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (suggesting that the federal 
government’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages valid in the states would humiliate the married, 
same-sex couples’ children because “[t]he law in question makes it even more difficult for the children 
to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in 
their community and in their daily lives.”). 
 86.  Id. at 2695. 
 87.  See id. (“DOMA . . . raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided 
by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses.”) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 106; Treas. Reg. § 1.106–1, 26 
CFR § 1.106–1 (2012); IRS Private Letter Ruling 9850011 (Sept. 10, 1998)).  
 88.  Cf. Kerry Hannon, Employers Penalizing Spouses for Health Insurance, NEXTAVENUE (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.nextavenue.org/employers-penalizing-spouses-health-insurance/ (“If you’re 
currently on your husband’s policy but work full-time for an employer that offers health benefits, check 
with your human resources department for details on enrolling. You might find that your employer 
provides a larger subsidy.”). 
 89.  See Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
23, 23 (2015) (suggesting that Obergefell “reifies marriage as a key element in the social front of family, 
further marginalizing nonmarital families”). 
 90.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). 
 91.  Cf. Tribe, supra note 44, at 28 (“But in Obergefell, the lesson went further, teaching that the 
deeper purposes of neither equal protection nor due process could be satisfied if only negative liberty—
the liberty ‘to engage in intimate association without criminal liability’—was entitled to constitutional 
protection.”). 
 92.  Colker, supra note 46, at 406 (“One must wonder if the stigma against nonmarital parents and 
their children will increase as a new group is allowed to enter the institution of marriage, because 
couples can no longer offer as an excuse that the state would not permit them to marry.”). 
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permits states to devalue such relationships.93 Such an interpretation might have 
important implications in states with constitutional amendments that preclude 
according the benefits of marriage to those in non-marital relationships, especially 
if those prohibitions are construed broadly.94 
B. Glucksberg and the Right to Marry 
While Obergefell is important because it struck down same-sex marriage bans, 
it also may turn out to be very important because of how it treats Washington v. 
Glucksberg.95 Glucksberg involved a challenge to a Washington assisted-suicide 
prohibition.96 The plaintiffs were doctors who, but for the law, would have 
provided assistance to terminally ill patients who wished to end their lives.97 
The Glucksberg Court began its due process analysis “by examining our 
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,”98 noting a long history of 
criminalizing suicide and the assistance of suicide.99 The Court announced that its 
“established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary 
features.”100 The first was that “the Due Process Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition,’”101 and the second was that “in substantive-due-
process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest”102 
is necessary. The Court then noted some of the rights that had already been 
recognized: the right to marry,103 the right to procreation,104 the right to direct the 
education of upbringing of one’s children,105 the right to use contraception 
whether within marriage106 or outside of it,107 and the right to abortion.108 
 
 
 93.  Cf. Carpenter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 125 (discussing Obergefell’s “disturbing denigration 
of those who are not married”). 
 94.  Cf. Mark Strasser, The Right to Marry and State Marriage Amendments: Implications for Future 
Families, 45 STETSON L. REV. 309, 315–33 (2016) (discussing the constraints imposed by such state 
constitutional amendments). 
 95.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 96.  Id. at 705–06 (“The question presented in this case is whether Washington’s prohibition 
against ‘caus[ing]’ or ‘aid[ing]’ a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”).  
 97.  Id. at 707 (“These doctors occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, and declare that 
they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for Washington’s assisted-suicide ban.”). 
 98.  Id. at 710 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1992)). 
 99.  Id. at 711–18. 
 100.  Id. at 720. 
 101.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 102.  Id. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
 103.  Id. at 720 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 104.  Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1942)). 
 105.  Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925)). 
 106.  Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)). 
 107.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 472 (1972)). 
 108.  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 839–40 (1992)). 
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The Glucksberg Court neglected to mention that its recommended due process 
approach would not have protected all of the interests that it described as 
fundamental.109  For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut in which the Court struck 
down a Connecticut law denying marital couples access to contraception,110 Justice 
Stewart noted in dissent that the Connecticut law had been on the books for over 
eighty years.111 So, too, consider Loving v. Virginia in which the Court struck down 
Virginia’s interracial marriage ban.112 Virginia had laws banning interracial 
marriage while it was still a colony.113 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down 
a Massachusetts law that had been on the books in some form for over 90 years.114 
In Roe v. Wade, the Court struck down an abortion law that had been in existence 
for almost 120 years,115 a fact emphasized by then-Justice Rehnquist in his 
dissent.116 If these laws had been on the books for decades, then it could hardly be 
said that protection of the rights at issue was deeply rooted in the Nation’s history 
and traditions. But this means that the substantive due process approach described 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion in Glucksberg117 was the 
approach not used in the very cases in which many of the fundamental rights were 
recognized. Had the Court employed the Glucksberg approach in those earlier 
cases, it would likely have reached much different conclusions, as then-Justice 




 109.  Strasser, supra note 19, at 112–13 (“[T]he history and tradition test is inappropriate to 
determine fundamental rights because its use would mean, for example, that the right to have access 
to contraception or abortions are also not fundamental rights. . . .”). 
 110.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480  
The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in this appeal are ss 53—32 and 54—196 of 
the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides: 
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of 
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less 
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned. 
Section 54—196 provides: 
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit 
any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. 
 111.  See id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Since 1879 Connecticut has had on its books a law which 
forbids the use of contraceptives by anyone.”).  
 112.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely 
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 113.  See Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the 
Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1968 (1989) (“Virginia was . . . one of the first 
colonies to formulate a legal definition of race and to enact prohibitions against interracial marriage 
and interracial sex.”). 
 114.  See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 (“Section 21 stems from Mass. Stat.1879, c. 159, s 1, which 
prohibited without exception, distribution of articles intended to be used as contraceptives.”). 
 115.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).  
 116.  See id. at 176–77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Texas statute struck down today was, as 
the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 and ‘has remained substantially unchanged to the present 
time.’”). 
 117.  See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705 (“Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.”). 
 118.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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incompatible with a later decision—Lawrence— where that decision recognizes a 
fundamental right to engage in non-marital relations.119 
While Glucksberg does not provide a principle that plausibly accounts for 
those interests that have been recognized as fundamental rights, a separate 
question is whether Obergefell required overruling Glucksberg or, at least, severely 
limiting its reach.120 The Obergefell Court noted “Glucksberg did insist that liberty 
under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, 
with central reference to specific historical practices.”121 But, the Obergefell Court 
explained, “Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’ . . . and 
Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to 
marry.’”122 Instead, in each case the Court considered whether “there was a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”123 
One way to accommodate Glucksberg while still striking down same-sex 
marriage bans would be to suggest that the Glucksberg analysis is only triggered if 
the recognition of new rather than existing rights is involved.124 Because the right 
to marry had already been recognized prior to Glucksberg, Glucksberg’s analysis 
would be inapplicable when deciding whether the already-recognized right to 
marry included the right to marry a same-sex partner.125 
The Obergefell Court did not simply reject the applicability of Glucksberg 
because the right to marry had already been recognized as a fundamental right. 
Rather, although recognizing that “[t]he right to marry is fundamental as a matter 
of history and tradition,”126 the Court also suggested that “rights come not from 
ancient sources alone.”127 Such an approach, while not overruling Glucksberg, 
nonetheless severely limited its reach—”while that approach [in Glucksberg] may 




 119.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Glucksberg was incompatible 
with a holding that the right to engage in non-marital relations is fundamental). But the Obergefell Court 
suggested that the right to engage in such relations was indeed fundamental. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2606. 
 120.  Chief Justice Roberts wrongly suggests that the two decisions were incompatible. See 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is revealing that the majority’s position 
requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive 
due process.”). 
 121.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 
135 S. Ct. 286 (2014), and cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. McQuigg v. Bostic, 
135 S. Ct. 314 (2014) (“Glucksberg ‘s analysis applies only when courts consider whether to recognize 
new fundamental rights.”). 
 125.  Id. (“Because we conclude that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-
sex marriage, Glucksberg ‘s analysis is inapplicable here.”); see also Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of 
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 163–64 (2015) (“Obergefell presented the Court 
with an escape hatch that would have allowed it to leave the Glucksberg view of tradition intact.”). 
 126.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 127.  Id.  
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suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing 
other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”128 
The Obergefell Court made explicit what should have been clear upon a brief 
examination of those interests recognized as fundamental129—the Glucksberg 
history and tradition test does not plausibly account for those rights recognized as 
fundamental. Yet, the history and tradition test has been cited as a reason not to 
recognize particular interests as fundamental,130 and after Obergefell the Court may 
have to provide a different rationale when rejecting that a particular interest 
qualifies as a fundamental right.131 Before that standard is discussed, however,132 
a different point might be made. It would be unsurprising for members of the 
Court sometime in the future to claim that the right to marry has long been 
recognized as a fundamental right as a matter of history and tradition,133 and that 
the Court’s severe limitation of Glucksberg134 was mere dictum and not entitled to 
precedential weight.135 As to how many justices will assert that position, this may 
depend upon who is nominated and confirmed to occupy any open seats on the 
Court.136 
C. The Judicial Role 
Courts following Obergefell and employing the Glucksberg approach only 
when physician-assisted suicide is at issue will need to know what approach to 
employ when other kinds of interests are alleged to be protected by substantive 
due process guarantees.137 The Court engaged in a brief discussion of the role of 
 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. 
 130.  See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2134 (2015) (“[B]efore conferring constitutional status 
upon a previously unrecognized ‘liberty,’ we have required ‘a careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest,’ as well as a demonstration that the interest is ‘objectively, deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.’”) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21). 
 131.  But see infra text following this note. 
 132.  See infra notes 137–45 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 135.  See Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 296 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“We accord no precedential weight to mere dicta.”).  
 136.  David Garrow, Op-Ed , Four Supreme Court Justices are older than 75. Is that a problem?  L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0202-garrow-aging-judiciary-
20160202-story.html (“Today we have four Supreme Court justices who are superannuated: Stephen 
G. Breyer is 77, Anthony M. Kennedy will turn 80 this summer, Antonin Scalia will celebrate his 80th 
birthday on March 11, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg will celebrate her 83rd four days later. Both Clarence 
Thomas, 67, and Samuel A. Alito Jr., 65, also qualify for Social Security.”). Justice Scalia died within 
two weeks of the publication of that op ed. See also Jamie Gangel, Ariane de Vogue, Evan Perez & Kevin 
Bohn, Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court justice, dies at 79, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 15, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/13/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/index.html 
(“U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the leading conservative voice on the high court, has died 
at the age of 79, a government source and a family friend told CNN on Saturday.”). 
 137.  Some commentators seem not to appreciate how Obergefell attempted to cabin Glucksberg’s 
reach. See O’Rourke, supra note 3, at 16 (“Obergefell thus opens a doctrinal space for extending well-
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the judiciary, noting that “[t]he identification and protection of fundamental rights 
is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.”138 Because 
the way to exercise “[t]hat responsibility, however, ‘has not been reduced to any 
formula,’”139 judges must “exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of 
the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.”140 
Reasoned judgment cannot perform its function unless informed by 
something, and the Court suggested that the judging process “is guided by many 
of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions 
that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements.”141 Judges should 
consider “[h]istory and tradition [a] guide”142 rather than as setting “outer 
boundaries.”143 The Court warned that according history and tradition a more 
privileged status might “allow . . . the past alone to rule the present.”144 That said, 
however, courts using history and tradition as a guide might reach the same 
conclusions in particular cases as courts using history and tradition as the 
criterion, which means that post-Obergefell courts may not be recognizing rights 
that pre-Obergefell courts would not also have recognized. At the very least, it is 
too early to declare that Obergefell marks a major change.145 
After laying out this vision of judging, the Obergefell Court implied that this 
was the method of judging that had been in use by members of the Court for a 
long time. “Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to 
marry is protected by the Constitution.”146 The Court then noted that the right to 
marry had been recognized in Loving v. Virginia, a decision issued in 1967,147 and 
reaffirmed that position in Zablocki v. Redhail148 and Turner v. Safley.149 But the Court 
implied that the recognition of marriage as a fundamental right predated 1967. 




recognized due process rights to new groups, and applying those rights in new contexts. If a litigant 
cannot persuasively frame her due process claim in terms of a well-recognized right, then Glucksberg 
may be fatal to the claim.”). 
 138.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 139.  Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572).  
 144.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 145.  See Yoshino, supra note 125, at 148 (“Obergefell became something even more than a landmark 
civil rights decision. It became a game changer for substantive due process jurisprudence.”); cf. Michael 
W. McConnell, Time, Institutions and Interpretation, 95 B. U. L. REV. 1745, 1782 (2015) (suggesting that 
Obergefell seems “to open the door to whatever new rights might appeal to the sensibilities of five 
Justices”). 
 146.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 147.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 148.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 384 (1978).”). 
 149.  Id. (“The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987)”).  
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is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”150 Among the cases cited for that 
proposition was one issued in 1923151 and another issued in 1888.152 
After suggesting that the right to marry had been recognized for more than 
three quarters of a century before Loving,153 the Court made what appeared to be a 
damning admission:154 “It cannot be denied that this Court’s cases describing the 
right to marry presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.”155 Such 
a comment is surprising. Whether such a claim can be denied depends upon the 
kind of presumption at issue. If this is a logical presumption and marriage for 
same-sex couples serves the same purposes as it does for different-sex couples,156 
then the presumption not only can but should be denied. Further, the Obergefell 
Court stated that “the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution 
apply with equal force to same-sex couples,”157 so there is an important sense in 
which that presumption must be denied. But that makes the Obergefell Court’s 
statement all the more mysterious. 
As support for its claim that marriage was presumed to be for different-sex 
couples, the Court explained that “[t]his was evident in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 
810 (1972), a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question.”158 
The explanation for the Baker holding was that “[t]he Court, like many institutions, 
ha[d] made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it [wa]s a part.”159 
Yet, the Court failed to note that a mere eleven years before the Court struck 
down interracial marriage bans in Loving v. Virginia,160 the Court in Naim v. Naim 
refused to hear a challenge to Virginia’s interracial marriage ban because “the case 
[was] devoid of a properly presented federal question.”161 Mentioning Naim would 
have put the Court’s analysis in a whole different light. 
Consider the Court’s suggestion that the right to marry presumed different-
sex partners, as was indicated by the Court’s having denied in an earlier opinion 
that a challenge to a same-sex union ban implicated federal guarantees. That same 
reasoning would suggest that the marriage jurisprudence prior to Loving 
presumed relationships between individuals of the same race, as was indicated by 
 
 150.  Id. (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 639–40 (1974)). 
 151.  Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 152.  See id. at 2601 (discussing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)). 
 153.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) was issued 79 years after Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 
(1888). 
 154.  Perhaps not appreciating what the Court was actually admitting, see infra notes 189–90 and 
accompanying text, Chief Justice Roberts expressly noted this statement in his dissent. See Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2619 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“As the majority admits, the institution of ‘marriage’ 
discussed in every one of these cases ‘presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.”). 
 155.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 156.  Cf. id. at 2601 (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect 
to this principle.”). 
 157.  Id. at 2599. 
 158.  Id. at 2598. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 161.  Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956). 
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the Court’s having denied in an earlier opinion that a challenge to an interracial 
union ban implicated federal guarantees. 
Such a claim about presumptions would not have implied that interracial 
marriages were prohibited everywhere, because interracial marriages were 
permitted in about half the states when Naim was decided162 and in even more 
states when Loving was issued.163 Instead, the presumption would have meant 
something else—for example, that the Court did not believe that the Federal 
Constitution required the recognition of interracial marriages.164 
One explanation for why the Naim Court might have denied that a federal 
question was implicated was that the Court might have believed that the 
regulation of marriage was a matter left for the states.165 That explanation would 
seem subject to the following criticism. In an earlier case involving the same 
parties, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case for further 
consideration.166 But, it might be thought, if marriage were simply a matter left to 
the states, the United States should not have remanded the case the first time but, 
instead, have said that there was no federal issue implicated. 
That said, there is another way to understand what the Court was doing the 
first time it heard the case.  In 1955, the Naim Court wrote: 
The inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the parties to the 
Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in North Carolina and upon 
their return to Virginia, and the failure of the parties to bring here all questions 
relevant to the disposition of the case, prevents the constitutional issue of the 
validity of the Virginia statute on miscegenation tendered here being considered 
‘in clean cut and concrete form, unclouded’ by such problems.167 
In what respect was the record incomplete? One possibility was that the 
Court was not sure where the parties were domiciled at the time of the marriage.168 
If, for example, the couple had moved to North Carolina and married there where 
such marriages were permitted, then the marriage would have been valid in the 
domicile at the time of the marriage.169 In that event, a subsequent move to Virginia 
 
 162.  See Legal Map: Accessible Version, LOVINGDAY, http://lovingday.org/legal-map-accessible (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 163.  See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (“Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages 
on the basis of racial classifications.”). 
 164.  But see infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Court might not have 
interpreted federal constitutional guarantees that way). 
 165.  Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–90 (“By history and tradition the definition and regulation of 
marriage, as will be discussed in more detail, has been treated as being within the authority and realm 
of the separate States.”). The Windsor Court also noted that state regulation of marriage was subject to 
federal constitutional guarantees. See id. at 2691 (“State laws defining and regulating marriage, of 
course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons.”) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
 166.  See Naim, 350 U.S. at 891 (“The judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals in order that the case may be returned to the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth 
for action not inconsistent with this opinion.”). 
 167.  Id. (citing Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)). 
 168.  Strasser, supra note 19, at 79 (“The Court might instead have believed that the important issue 
was whether either of the parties was domiciled in Virginia when the marriage was contracted in North 
Carolina.”). 
 169.  Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 243 
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would have raised issues that could be addressed without speaking to the validity 
of Virginia’s interracial marriage ban.170 
Commentators disagree about why the Naim Court denied that interracial 
marriage bans implicated federal guarantees.171 In any event, just as Naim did not 
settle how Loving would be decided, Baker v. Nelson172 did not settle how Obergefell 
would be decided. Baker did not settle the matter because there “are other, more 
instructive precedents,”173 and “in assessing whether the force and rationale of its 
cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the 
right to marry has been long protected.”174 Precisely because “the reasons marriage 
is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex 
couples,”175 the Court suggested that a position that once had seemed sensible, 
namely, that same-sex couples could be precluded from marrying, was simply no 
longer tenable.176 
If the Court had discussed Naim and had pointed out that an interracial 
marriage ban that (allegedly) did not implicate federal guarantees during the 
fifties nonetheless implicated those guarantees in the sixties, then it might have 
been easier to understand how a same-sex marriage ban that (allegedly) did not 
implicate federal guarantees in the 1970s nonetheless implicated such guarantees 
more than forty years later. But making this history clear would have made 
Obergefell seem less revolutionary.177 
It also would have served other purposes as well, because it would have 
undercut one of the dissent’s criticisms, namely, that interracial marriage bans 
were not even analogous to same-sex marriage bans. Ironically, Chief Justice 
Roberts helped illustrate in his dissent why the two kinds of bans were more 
analogous than many seemed to admit. For example, he noted in his dissent that 
 
(1991) (“Yielding to Frankfurter’s importuning, the Court remanded Naim to the Virginia Supreme 
Court on the pretext that the parties’ domicile stood in need of clarification.”); see also Mark Strasser, 
Naiming the States Where Loving Will Be Recognized: On Tea Leaves, Horizontal Federalism, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 17 (2015) (“Suppose, for example, that Ruby and Han had 
planned to move to North Carolina where their marriage was legal. In that event, they would have 
been marrying in accord with the law of the domicile at the time of the marriage.”). 
 170.  See State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 247 (1877) (upholding the validity of an interracial marriage 
contracted in another domicile even though such marriages could not be celebrated within the state). 
 171.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 449 
(2005) (“A majority of the Justices apparently preferred being humiliated at the hands of truculent state 
jurists to further stoking the fires of racial controversy ignited by Brown.”); Alexander Tsesis, Justice at 
War and Brown v. Board of Education, 47 HOW. L.J. 361, 379 (2004) (“The Court’s refusal to rule on the 
substance of Naim reflected Justice Felix Frankfurter’s influence on his fellow Justices, in particular, 
Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and Stanley Reed, who initially wanted to hear the case 
on the merits.”); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 827 (2011) (discussing the 
view that consequentialist considerations may justify caution as was exemplified in Naim). 
 172.  409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 173.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 174.  Id. at 2599. 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. at 2602 (“The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural 
and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now 
manifest.”). 
 177.  See Yoshino, supra note 125, at 148 (describing Obergefell as “a game changer”). 
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“the interracial marriage ban at issue in Loving [did not] define marriage as ‘the 
union of a man and a woman of the same race.’”178 What did the statute at issue in 
Loving state? “All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be 
absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process.”179 But Chief 
Justice Roberts failed to include the wording of some of the statutes banning same-
sex marriage. For example, Ohio law specified: “Any marriage between persons 
of the same sex shall have no legal force or effect in this state and, if attempted to 
be entered into in this state, is void ab initio and shall not be recognized by this 
state.”180 While there were differences between the marriage prohibitions 
especially because Virginia had criminalized attempting to enter into an interracial 
marriage,181 it was nonetheless true that both kinds of marriage were treated as 
void ab initio and neither defined marriage as excluding a particular kind of union. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the Court was somehow 
seeking “to change the core definition of marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman.”182 But such a criticism seemed anachronistic, because various states were 
already recognizing same-sex marriage.183 Indeed, the number of states 
recognizing same-sex marriage at the time Obergefell was issued was comparable 
to the number of states recognizing interracial marriage at the time Loving was 
issued.184 
Members of the Court clearly disagree about whether the state furthers 
legitimate interests by reserving marriage for different-sex couples, but that 
disagreement at least can be discussed, for example, by analyzing whether the 
interests served by recognizing different-sex marriages are also served by 
recognizing same-sex marriages.185  But appeals to core definitions are unhelpful 
as a mode of analysis, especially when the alleged core definition did not reflect 
the law of almost three quarters of the states.186 
When discussing the presumption that marriage was for individuals of 
different sexes, the Court was not implying that the purposes of marriage can only 
be served by individuals of different sexes—on the contrary, the Obergefell Court 
 
 178.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 179.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 5 (citing VA. CODE ANN. 20—57 (1960 Repl.Vol.)). 
 180.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (C)(1) (West). 
 181.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 5 n.4 (“It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to 
marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and American 
Indian.”) (citing Section 20—54 of the Virginia Code). 
 182.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 183.  See Faith Karimi & Michael Pearson, The 13 states that still ban same-sex marriage, CNN (Feb. 13, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/us/states-same-sex-marriage-ban/ (discussing the thirteen 
states that still prohibited same-sex marriage before Obergefell was issued)  
 184.  When Loving was issued, sixteen states prohibited interracial marriage. See supra note 163. 
When Obergefell was issued, thirteen states prohibited same-sex marriage. See supra note 183. 
 185.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[D]istinguishing between opposite-
sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ ‘legitimate state interest’ in ‘preserving the 
traditional institution of marriage.’”) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment)). But see id. at 2599–601 (discussing why recognizing same-sex marriage promotes both state 
and individual interests) 
 186.  See supra note 183 (noting that only thirteen states did not recognize same-sex marriage when 
Obergefell was issued). 
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explicitly denied such an assertion.187 Instead, the Court was discussing what 
individual justices presumed, which is why it said that “[t]he limitation of 
marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its 
inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now 
manifest.”188 Here, the Court was echoing an observation made in Lawrence that 
“times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”189 
Ironically, there may be a reason that the Court decided not to refer to Naim. 
If one accepts that members of the Naim Court knew that interracial marriage bans 
were unconstitutional but did not want to issue that holding for fear of a 
backlash,190 then that Court would not have been blinded by the times but instead 
making a calculation about the timing effects of the decision.191 In contrast, the 
Obergefell Court implied that the Baker Court (and, perhaps, the dissenting 
members of the Obergefell Court) were simply blinded by the times. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Almost all of the Loving Court opinion addressed why Virginia’s interracial 
marriage ban violated federal equal protection guarantees,192 and only a short part 
of the opinion addressed why that ban violated due process guarantees.193 Some 
 
 187.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–601 (noting the various interests served by recognizing same-
sex marriage). 
 188.  Id. at 2602. 
 189.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. See also Yoshino, supra note 125, at 163 (noting that in Obergefell “[i]t 
was all [discussed] there again—the problem of the blindness of each generation”). 
 190.  See Rebecca Schoff, Deciding on Doctrine: Anti-Miscegenation Statutes and the Development of 
Equal Protection Analysis, 95 VA. L. REV. 627, 637 (2009) (“Internal correspondence between Court 
members at the time indicates that the prospects of further backlash influenced the Court when it chose 
to avoid confronting anti-miscegenation statutes in these cases.”); Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: 
A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 409 n.122 (2012) (“The Court did not want to 
decide the case immediately after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for fear of a massive 
backlash and greater resistance to the Court’s holding that schools must desegregate.”). 
 191.  Cf. Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through the Lens of Political 
Science, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1131, 1152 (2014) (“In a speech at Columbia University Law School in 
early 2012, Ginsburg explained that judicial restraint can sometimes be a more effective policy choice 
for the justices than making an expansive, aggressive decision like Roe: ‘It’s not that the judgment was 
wrong, but it moved too far too fast.’”). 
 192.  Jessica Knouse, Civil Marriage: Threat to Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 361, 391 (2012) 
(“[M]ost of the Court’s opinion in Loving focused on equal protection rather than substantive due 
process . . . .”); Strasser, supra note 29, at 190 (“While Loving establishes the fundamental right to marry, 
most of that opinion was focused on the equal protection aspect of the interracial marriage ban.”); 
Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of 
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1197 (2004) (“Loving is primarily thought of as an equal 
protection case . . . .”). 
 193.  Shuler, supra note 29, at 263 (“The bulk of the Loving opinion relied on equal protection to 
strike down the anti-miscegenation law, however Chief Justice Warren’s opinion also briefly but 
explicitly relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause.”); Jeremiah Egger, 
Glucksberg, Lawrence, and the Decline of Loving’s Marriage Precedent, 98 VA. L. REV. 1825, 1828 (2012) 
(“While Loving is primarily an equal protection case, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion closes with a 
succinct and forceful due process analysis . . . .”).  
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commentators have suggested that the Obergefell Court missed a golden 
opportunity by not holding that same-sex marriage bans violate equal protection 
guarantees.194 Just as the Loving Court struck down interracial marriage bans as a 
violation of both substantive due process and equal protection guarantees, the 
Obergefell Court might have adopted a similar approach.195 Yet, the confusing 
aspect of the opinion is not that the Obergefell Court failed to mention equal 
protection but, instead, what to make of what the Court actually said. 
A. Obergefell’s Equal Protection Approach 
In holding that same-sex couples can exercise the fundamental right to marry, 
the Court provided the basis for striking down same-sex marriage bans without 
even addressing equal protection concerns. But the Court did discuss equal 
protection, albeit in a way that is likely to yield more confusion rather than less.196 
After holding that the right to marry a same-sex partner was included within 
the right to marry,197 the Court noted that equal protection was also implicated. 
“The right of same-sex couples to marry . . . is derived, too, from [the Fourteenth] 
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”198 The Court 
explained that “[r]ights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection 
may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some 
instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”199 
Thus, the Court suggested that equal protection and due process guarantees may 
but need not inform their respective reaches. 
By way of explanation, the Court discussed two of the marriage cases, Loving 
and Zablocki.200 The Obergefell Court noted that the Loving “Court first declared the 
[marriage] prohibition invalid because of its unequal treatment of interracial 
couples,”201 and then “[w]ith this link to equal protection the Court proceeded to 
hold the prohibition offended central precepts of liberty.”202 While the Obergefell 
Court is correct that in Loving the equal protection analysis was offered first203 and 
then only later was the due process analysis included,204 the Court nonetheless 
risks confusion by framing the opinion this way—the Court leaves open whether 
 
 194.  Mayeri, supra note 77, at 131 (“The omission of a sex or sexual orientation discrimination 
analysis in Obergefell understandably disappointed many observers.”). 
 195.  Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 137, 140 (2015) (“Even if 
Justice Kennedy felt it necessary to reach the fundamental rights claim in Obergefell and overrule the 
Court’s summary dismissal of such a claim in Baker v. Nelson, he could again have followed the Loving 
example and rendered a decision declaring the statute unconstitutional on both substantive due 
process and class-based equal protection grounds.”). 
 196.  See infra notes 197–248 and accompanying text. 
 197.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (“The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the 
fundamental right to marry.”).  
 198.  Id. at 2602. 
 199.  Id. at 2603. 
 200.  See id. 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Id.  
 203.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–12. 
 204.  Id. at 12. 
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the due process analysis (holding that the interest in marriage is fundamental) is 
in some way dependent upon the finding that equal protection guarantees had 
been violated.205 
Allegedly, Zablocki also illustrated “[t]he synergy between the two 
protections,”206 where “the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis 
for invalidating the challenged law.”207 In Zablocki, “[t]he equal protection analysis 
depended in central part on the Court’s holding that the law burdened a right ‘of 
fundamental importance.’”208 That is correct, precisely because the classification at 
issue in Zablocki—indigency—did not trigger heightened review.209 But this only 
makes the Obergefell Court’s position more opaque, given the lack of work equal 
protection seems to be doing in Zablocki.210 As Justice Stewart pointed out in his 
Zablocki concurrence in the judgment: “The Equal Protection Clause deals not with 
substantive rights or freedoms but with invidiously discriminatory 
classifications.”211 The constitutional difficulty posed by the Wisconsin statute was 
that “it exceed[ed] the bounds of permissible state regulation of marriage, and 
invade[d] the sphere of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”212 
The Obergefell opinion did include the language one might expect in an 
analysis striking down a statute on equal protection grounds—”[t]he imposition 
of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate 
them.”213 The Court had used similar language in previous opinions. For example, 
when striking down a state constitutional amendment precluding affording anti-
discrimination protection on the basis of orientation, the Court noted in Romer v. 
Evans214 that the amendment at issue “classifies homosexuals not to further a 
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”215 So, too, in 
United States v. Windsor, the Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act at 
least in part because of its attempted “interference with the equal dignity of same-
sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign 
power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its 
essence.”216 But at least one of the questions at issue in Obergefell was whether the 
State’s classifying on the basis of the sexes or orientations of the parties was itself 
a sufficient ground for striking the bans.217 While the Court wrote that same-sex 
 
 205.  Cf. supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 206.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id. (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383).   
 209.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 210.  But see infra notes 226–39 and accompanying text. 
 211.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring opinion)). 
 212.  Id. at 391–92 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 213.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.  
 214.  517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 215.  Id. at 635. 
 216.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 217.  Commentators disagree whether Obergefell foreshadows recognizing orientation as a quasi-
suspect class. Compare Dena H. Sokolow, Governmental Agencies Can Be Our Guides to Future Trends in 
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marriage bans “abridge central precepts of equality,”218 the Court left open 
whether it would strike down “unjustified inequality [even when not] within our 
most fundamental institutions.”219 It is thus difficult to tell whether after Obergefell 
the Court will strike down statutes discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation when mere liberty interests are at issue.220 
B.  Obergefell’s Equal Protections Implications 
Some commentators have already noted that the Court has sometimes 
combined liberty and equality in its analyses of which statutes pass muster.221 The 
Court reinforced the accuracy of that observation when suggesting that “[r]ights 
implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection . . . in some instances . . . 
may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”222 Nonetheless, that 
suggestion was worrisome because the examples offered by the Court were at best 
ambiguous.  Zablocki is often discussed as a case involving due process rather than 
equal protection.223 The point is not to deny that Zablocki stated that it was doing 
equal protection analysis,224 but merely to suggest that the level of scrutiny was 
likely not increased because of the equal protection aspects of the case and that the 
statute’s constitutionality would have been upheld had a mere liberty interest been 
at stake.225 
 
Employment Law, ASPATORE, 2015 WL 9875511 *1, at *2 (“Obergefell is not a broad guarantee of protection 
against sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, but it is likely a preview of future 
developments in employment law and a shift toward eventual recognition of sexual orientation and 
gender identity as a protected class.”) with Ann L. Schiavone, Unleashing the Fourteenth Amendment, 
2016 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 27, 28 (2016) (“Obergefell potentially signal[s] a shift away from declaration 
of new rights and suspect classes, while applying a stronger rational basis test.”). 
 218.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 219.  Id. at 2603. 
 220.  See Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 HOUS. L. REV. 157, 161 (2015) (suggesting 
that Obergefell “will not prohibit discrimination against LGBT individuals in other contexts”); but see 
Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281, 329 (2015) (“But 
it now will be difficult indeed—even in a non-fundamental rights case—for government to justify using 
sexual orientation as a basis for denying liberty interests.”). See also Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of 
Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 21 (2015) (“Whether Obergefell will bode well for civil rights litigation, 
as I believe it has the power do, or will further undermine attempts to achieve at least formal equality, 
we will know only with the passage of time.”). 
 221.  See Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2004) 
(“[L]iberty and equality are more intertwined.”). 
 222.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 223.  See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“the decision to marry is a fundamental right 
under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 600 n.11 (1984) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing Zablocki as “invalidating a statute that, as applied to most persons, 
seriously intruded upon, but did not abrogate, the right to marry”); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 224 (1990) (“In Turner itself we applied the reasonableness standard to a prison regulation that 
imposed severe restrictions on the inmate’s right to marry, a right protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–96 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)); Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 307 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing Zablocki as “striking down a statute 
that conditioned the right to marry upon the satisfaction of child-support obligations.”). 
 224.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382 (“[T]he statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 225.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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Nonetheless, the Court could be suggesting that the class at issue in Zablocki 
did some work in the opinion sub silentio.226 A different case cited by the Court,227 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J,228 also extended protection to an impoverished individual, holding 
that “Mississippi may not deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review 
of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain 
a parent.”229 Parenting rights also implicate a fundamental interest,230 so perhaps 
Obergefell, Zablocki, and M.L.B. all involve these hybrids. 
The Obergefell Court also discussed Loving, which is traditionally viewed as 
providing two independent justifications for striking down the Virginia 
antimiscegenation law.231  However, describing the guarantees as working 
together232 might be taken to imply that the equal protection or due process 
guarantees, standing alone, would not suffice to justify striking down the statute. 
In some sense, equal protection and due process work together as a general 
matter. When the state precludes some from enjoying a benefit that others enjoy, 
the state is distinguishing between classes of individuals and those denied the 
benefit might at least claim that they were not being treated equally.233 Further, 
individuals claiming to be harmed are presumably claiming that some interest is 
at stake, so due process would be implicated at least to the extent that the contested 
statute would be to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.234 Thus, there 
 
 226.  See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 73 (1992) (“The combination of 
treating the poor differently from the rich with the right to marry . . . persuaded the Court.”); C. Quince 
Hopkins, The Supreme Court’s Family Law Doctrine Revisited: Insights from Social Science on Family 
Structures and Kinship Change in the United States, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 466 (2004) (“Zablocki, 
like Loving, stands for the proposition that the right to marry is a protected liberty interest, but only 
state interference that employs a method that allocates that right differently with respect to some 
groups than to others is unconstitutional.”). 
 227.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 228.  519 U.S. 102 (1996).  
 229.  Id. at 107.  
 230.  See id. at 109 (discussing the importance of the right at issue); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (“When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not 
merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.”). 
 231.  Jamal Greene, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE L.J. 1989, 1991–92 (2005) (“Loving 
v. Virginia, which held Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, was decided on two 
independent and equally adequate grounds.”). 
 232.  Cf. R.A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 55–56 (2015) 
(suggesting that Loving “supports the ‘double helix’ approach resurrected in Obergefell to the extent 
that it relies on both equality and due process-based principles in invalidating Virginia’s interracial 
marriage ban”). 
 233.  David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial 
Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 798 (1991) (“All statutes operate through 
classification. Thus, statutes always treat people as members of groups and, in general, legislatures are 
free to classify so long as they pursue their permissible objectives rationally.”). Cf. John C. Philo, Local 
Government Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfranchisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J. L. SOCIETY 
71, 93 (2011) (“Many statutes classify persons into groups and treat the groups differently without 
raising constitutional concerns.”). 
 234.  Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789 (1986), overruled 
by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (White, J. dissenting) (“State action 
impinging on individual interests need only be rational to survive scrutiny under the Due Process 
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might seem to be no harm in talking about both kinds of guarantees being 
implicated in that it should not be difficult to talk about some sense in which both 
equal protection (perhaps involving the lowest level of scrutiny)235 and the due 
process guarantees (perhaps involving the lowest level of scrutiny)236 are 
implicated. 
Yet, that approach carries risks if only because of how it might be construed. 
If due process and equal protection are (almost) always implicated, then requiring 
both to be triggered will not help determine which interests should be protected 
and which not. The Court will still have to find some way to distinguish among 
interests. But this means that characterizing the jurisprudence as involving both 
liberty and equality may well not result in the recognition of many new rights if 
only because of the Court’s ever-present desire to avoid opening floodgates.237 For 
 
Clause, and the determination of rationality is to be made with a heavy dose of deference to the policy 
choices of the legislature.”). See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of 
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 348 
(1991) (discussing “the generic doctrine that substantive due process shields individuals from arbitrary, 
capricious government misconduct”). 
 235.  See Jacquelyn M. Meirick, Through the Tiers: Are Iowa’s New Sex-Offender Laws Unconstitutional?, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 1013, 1023 n.65 (2011) (“Rational-basis review is the lowest level of constitutional 
scrutiny in deciding due-process and equal-protection claims under the U.S. Constitution.”); Susan E. 
Hauser, More Than Abstract Justice: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Equal Treatment of Same-Sex 
Married Couples Under Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 219 (2011) (“Rational 
basis review is the lowest level of scrutiny that can be applied to a law challenged as violating the 
plaintiff’s right to equal protection.”). 
 236.  Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 253, 258 (1998) (“The rational relationship test is the lowest level of due process scrutiny and is 
applied in the absence of a fundamental right.”); Matthew R. Madara, Constitutional Law—Sacrificing 
the Good of the Few for the Good of the Many: Denying the Terminally Ill Access to Experimental Medication, 
31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 535, 554 n.112 (2009) (“Rational basis scrutiny is the lowest level of judicial 
review that courts will apply in due process cases. This test is applied when the plaintiff is asserting a 
right that is not fundamental under the Constitution. Government regulation of such a right is 
permissible so long as there is a legitimate interest for the government’s regulation.”).  
 237.  See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1172 (2014) (“There is scant evidence, however, that 
these floodgate-opening concerns are more than hypothetical.”); Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
1121, 1130 (2013) (“And there are other reasons for concluding that our holding will not open any ‘plain 
error’ floodgates.”); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 753 (2012) (“Arrow’s floodgates 
argument assumes ‘a shocking degree of noncompliance’ with the Act . . . and seems to us more 
imaginary than real.”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (“We confronted a similar 
‘floodgates’ concern . . . but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise 
the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty . . . . A flood did not follow in that 
decision’s wake. “); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1978) (“As we stated in 
Switzerland Cheese Assn., Inc. v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 [1966], ‘we approach this statute 
[§ 1292(a)(1)] somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial 
orders.’”); Switzerland Cheese Ass’n. v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966) (“[W]e approach 
this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial 
orders.”);see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 569 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Allowing Robbins to pursue this suit, the Court maintains, would open the 
floodgates to a host of unworthy suits ‘in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting 
property interests.’”); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 499 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the 
end, the Court’s decision can only be explained by its increasingly familiar effort to guard the 
floodgates of litigation.”); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 58–59 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
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example, in M.L.B., the Court rejected that its holding posed a floodgates difficulty 
because “parental status termination decrees [are set] apart from mine run civil 
actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and 
child custody.”238 This suggests that analyzing issues in terms of a combination of 
due process and equal protection guarantees could result in fewer rather than 
additional interests being protected. At the very least, those celebrating the 
approach in Obergefell as beginning a new dawn with respect to the recognition of 
rights239 may well be doing so prematurely. 
The Obergefell Court made clear that it was only “in some instances”240 that 
“[r]ights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection . . . each may be 
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”241 The Court was not offering 
a more restrictive Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence such that only cases 
involving interests triggering closer scrutiny and classes triggering closer scrutiny 
would yield protected rights,242 and there was no suggestion of a hybrid analysis 
requirement analogous to that used in free exercise jurisprudence.243 Nonetheless, 
it would not be surprising if some courts were to read the opinion this way,244 if 
only because the (sometimes required?) “synergy between the two protections”245 
could be read in a way that is more expansive but also in a way that is more 
restrictive. 
Obergefell would have been more promising as a source of increased 
protections had it cited Plyer v. Doe246 as an example of the discussed synergy, 
 
dissenting) (“It will not open the ‘floodgates’ that, I suspect, the Court fears.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 304 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A] ‘floodgates’ argument can be easy to make and difficult 
to rebut.”). 
 238.  M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127. 
 239.  See Kenji Yoshino, Supreme Court Breakfast Table: Obergefell Recognizes the Connection between 
Liberty and Equality, SLATE (June 25, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
the_breakfast_table/features/2015/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2015_obergefell_v_hodges_links_l
iberty_and_equality.html 
(“For those who have despaired about the recognition of ‘new’ constitutional rights, such as the right 
to education or health care, that may be the lasting impact of this opinion.”); Nicolas, supra note 60, at 
334 (discussing the view that “the Obergefell decision was groundbreaking not only for its specific 
holding regarding the right of same-sex couples to marry, but also more broadly for altering the way 
in which the Court will recognize fundamental rights in the future”). 
 240.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 241.  Id.  
 242.  See id. (“Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different 
precepts and are not always co-extensive . . . .”).  
 243.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The only 
decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but 
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech 
and of the press.”); see also id. at 882 (rejecting the use of strict scrutiny because “[t]he present case does 
not present such a hybrid situation”). 
 244.  Cf. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–
8 (2015) (“The Court in Obergefell explicitly conflated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses . . . 
.”). 
 245.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 246.  457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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because the Court there seemed to use heightened scrutiny247 notwithstanding the 
absence of a protected class or fundamental interest.248 But the Obergefell Court did 
not even cite Plyler, so the best way to interpret the decision will have to await 
further developments in the jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Obergefell is an important decision with much promise. Like most if not all 
Supreme Court opinions, the decision is open to interpretation, although the 
Obergefell Court seemed to go out of its way to make matters open-ended. While 
the Court did wax eloquent about the benefits of marriage, that made sense from 
the perspective of those challenging the bans—they were in non-marital 
relationships and were arguing that they were being harmed by their state’s 
refusal to permit them to marry. 
The Court’s due process and equal protection analyses are open-ended in a 
few respects. The Court’s restriction of Glucksberg represents an admission that the 
decision did not reflect the method used by the Court to determine which rights 
are fundamental. But using history and tradition as a guide rather than as a strictly 
enforced limiting principle (except when it is not enforced) may not result in 
different holdings as a practical matter. One might expect, though, that the lower 
courts will vary more markedly in their analyses—some will be more willing to 
recognize new rights, whereas others will be no more willing to recognize that 
interests are protected than they would have been were Glucksberg vigorously 
enforced. 
Equal protection is similarly more open-ended. The Obergefell Court 
suggested that equal protection informed its decision, while at the same time not 
recognizing sexual orientation as a protected class. Perhaps in light of Romer, 
Lawrence, Windsor and Obergefell the Court will soon announce that orientation is 
suspect or quasi-suspect. Perhaps not. In any event, some lower courts will be 
more willing to strike down laws adversely affecting important (but not 
fundamental) interests of non-protected classes, whereas others may require some 
combination of heightened scrutiny for the interests and the class at issue before 
striking down a challenged law. 
Obergefell is open-ended is another way. The Supreme Court of the future 
considering Obergefell will find much in the decision to support its preferred view, 
whether that view involves expanding or restricting the protection of classes or 
interests. Obergefell is written in such a way that it can readily be used to support 
opposing constitutional perspectives, which means that the next few 
appointments to the Court will likely do much to determine Obergefell’s legacy. 
 
 247.  See id. at 244 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (“[B]y patching together bits and pieces of what might 
be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory 
custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.”). 
 248.  Id. (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court expressly—and correctly—rejects any suggestion 
that illegal aliens are a suspect class . . . or that education is a fundamental right.”). 
